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The Supreme Court is currently hearing a challenge to the six-stanza rendition of Vande Mataram filed by Carnatic vocalist T M Krishna, but beyond the challenge to the government diktat, the case has also brought a larger constitutional question into focus: how far can the State prescribe participation in a national symbol when parts of that symbol contain explicit religious references?
Krishna has challenged the Centre's directions requiring all six stanzas of Vande Mataram to be sung at official functions, directed particularly at the last four stanzas, which invoke Hindu deities, and at the legal consequences attached to refusal to participate. The petition contends that compulsory rendition of those portions raises concerns under secularism and the fundamental rights relating to freedom of conscience and religion.
The Supreme Court, however, has not held that the six stanzas violate secularism. During the September 22 hearing, the Bench, indicated that the State is entitled to determine the national song, while separately examining whether a person who refuses to sing because of a genuine religious or conscientious objection can face penal consequences. A verdict on the matter is still awaited.
Religious imagery and the constitutional meaning of secularism
The first question in the petition is whether the presence of Hindu religious references in a national symbol is, by itself, inconsistent with India's secular Constitution.
Secularism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. In Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973), the Supreme Court evolved the basic structure doctrine, while in S R Bommai v Union of India (1994), the Court expressly recognised secularism as a basic feature of the constitutional scheme.
The constitutional position, however, does not necessarily mean that every reference to religion in public life is prohibited. The Supreme Court has described Indian secularism as requiring the State to maintain neutrality and treat persons of different faiths equally. In M Ismail Faruqui v Union of India (1994), the Court observed that the State has no religion of its own and that all persons are entitled to freedom of conscience and religious freedom.
“The presence of religious imagery in a national song does not, by itself, make the song unconstitutional. The constitutional question concerns the legal effect of the State’s direction, particularly if it requires individuals to sing specific stanzas and imposes criminal or disciplinary consequences for refusal,” Alay Razvi, managing partner, Accord Juris told Business Standard.
He further added: "The relevant rights may include under Articles 19, 21, and 25 of the Constitution. The State may prescribe an official protocol for a national song, but compulsory participation in religiously sensitive portions can be challenged if it is arbitrary, disproportionate or inconsistent with freedom of conscience."
This distinction is important in the Vande Mataram case. The constitutional question is not simply whether the song contains religious imagery. It is whether the State, by mandating their rendition, crosses the line from recognising a historically significant national composition to requiring participation in an expression that an individual may regard as religious.
The Bench itself appeared to make this distinction during the hearing. Justice Joymalya Bagchi questioned whether the religious references in the song necessarily affect secularism, while indicating that the separate question of penal consequences for conscientious objectors requires further examination.
Article 25: The significance of freedom of conscience
Article 25(1) guarantees all persons freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise, and propagate religion, subject to constitutional limitations.
The expression 'freedom of conscience' is particularly important here. The protection is not confined to formal membership of a religion. It also concerns an individual's beliefs and the freedom to act consistently with them, subject to limitations imposed by the Constitution.
This brings the case close to the Supreme Court's decision in Bijoe Emmanuel v State of Kerala (1986).
In that case, three schoolchildren belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses sect did not sing the Anthem because of their religious beliefs, although they stood respectfully while it was being sung. The Supreme Court held that their expulsion violated Articles 19(1)(a) and 25(1). It also held that respectful non-participation did not amount to disrespect or disturbance of the Anthem.
The significance of Bijoe Emmanuel for the present controversy goes beyond the national anthem. It establishes a constitutional distinction between respect for a national symbol and compulsory participation in its rendition.
That distinction becomes particularly relevant where a person claims that singing particular words would conflict with his or her conscience.
Article 19(1)(a) and compelled expression
The issue also engages Article 19(1)(a), which protects freedom of speech and expression.
Singing is an expressive act. Therefore, the question is not only whether an individual has a religious objection, but also whether the State can compel an individual to engage in an expressive act conveying a message with which the person does not agree.
Bijoe Emmanuel is significant because the Supreme Court considered both Article 19(1)(a) and Article 25. The Court found that forcing the children to sing despite their thorough religious objection infringed their fundamental rights.
This principle could provide a constitutional boundary in the present case: the State may prescribe the official protocol for a national song, but that does not necessarily mean that every citizen can be compelled to sing all of it.
symbol versus religious endorsement
The case therefore raises a further distinction between State recognition and State endorsement.
A historical composition may contain religious imagery without becoming a religious text. But when the State prescribes its rendition at official functions, the question becomes whether that use remains a form of national symbolism or acquires a religious character for constitutional purposes.
The answer may depend on the purpose and manner of State action. A reference to a deity in a literary work is not automatically equivalent to State-sponsored worship. At the same time, a constitutional democracy cannot disregard the conscience of citizens merely because an expression has acquired national significance.
Who decides the Song?
The Supreme Court has also drawn a boundary around its own role. The Bench indicated that determining what constitutes the Song, including the question of the number of stanzas, is for the State to decide. It said the Court would not second-guess national sentiment associated with Vande Mataram.
But while the State may determine the content of a national symbol, the Constitution continues to govern the manner in which fundamental rights can be restricted.
Criminal law raises the stakes
The issue assumes greater significance because Parliament's 2026 amendment to Section 3 of the Prevention of Insults to Honour Act, 1971 extends penal protection to the Song. The amended provision deals with intentionally preventing the singing of the Anthem or Song or causing disturbance to an assembly engaged in such singing, with punishment extending to imprisonment, fine, or both.
The Supreme Court has indicated that Bijoe Emmanuel must continue to govern the position of pertinent objectors. The Court's observation is significant because a criminal statute cannot be interpreted in isolation from fundamental rights.
The constitutional question, therefore, is narrower and more precise than whether Vande Mataram is secular or religious. It is whether the State can attach criminal consequences to conduct that amounts only to respectful non-participation based on a genuine religious objection.
The constitutional question arising from the present controversy is more nuanced than whether the presence of references to Hindu deities in the later stanzas of Vande Mataram is, by itself, incompatible with secularism. “In my view, the more legally consequential question is what the State does with those words: whether it merely recognises a historical national song, or whether it compels an individual to affirm or perform words which that individual, on a genuine religious or conscientious basis, cannot in good faith sing,” said Tushar Agarwal, founder and managing partner, C.L.A.P. JURIS, Advocates & Solicitors.
The eventual constitutional balance may have to accommodate two principles at once: the State's authority to determine and protect national symbols, and the individual's constitutional freedom of conscience. The Vande Mataram litigation thus places national symbolism at the intersection of secularism, freedom of expression, religious freedom, and the limits of criminal law.
