Why India Can’t Ignore Myanmar’s ‘Sham Election’, What Could Be The Possible Outcomes?

Last Updated:December 09, 2025, 13:42 IST

India shares a 1,600-km border with Myanmar. Whatever happens in Myanmar after December 28 could affect northeast, India's strategic initiatives, and its geopolitical positioning

Although the December 28 vote in Myanmar appears predetermined, the period after the election may still witness political shifts. Some analysts observe that the junta, despite projecting control, faces increasing pressure and internal challenges. (Getty Images)

Myanmar will hold national elections on December 28, but nearly every major international observer, rights group, and political analyst agrees on one central fact: the polls will not reflect the will of the people. Since seizing power in February 2021, the military junta has dismantled democratic institutions, imprisoned opposition leaders, rewritten electoral rules, and intensified crackdowns across the country. Thus, the upcoming vote is widely viewed as an attempt by the junta to validate its rule and project political control rather than restore democratic governance.

Yet even elections lacking credibility can influence political dynamics. Analysts note that highly controlled polls can shift internal alliances, expose fractures within ruling establishments, or trigger backlash from armed groups and civilians. With Myanmar still in the grip of a nationwide civil war involving dozens of ethnic armed organisations and anti-junta resistance forces, the aftermath of the December vote may carry significant consequences.

For India, these developments are far from distant diplomacy. India shares a 1,600-km border with Myanmar, a region that has already experienced refugee inflows, security instability, insurgent spillover, and stalled development projects. Whatever happens in Myanmar after December 28 could directly affect India’s northeast, its strategic initiatives, and its wider geopolitical positioning in the region.

What Makes The December 28 Poll A ‘Sham’ Election?

The Myanmar military has promised elections since taking power in a coup, but the process leading to December 28 indicates that the outcome is predetermined. The electoral rolls, normally based on a complete census, are incomplete due to the nationwide conflict; only a fraction of the population has been formally surveyed. This leaves millions of potential voters excluded from the system even before votes are cast.

In addition, key leaders such as Aung San Suu Kyi and ousted President U Win Myint are under house arrest or facing charges that prevent them from participating. The political party ( League for Democracy) that led the previously elected government was dissolved by the junta, leaving no viable nationwide challenger to compete. Several smaller parties are allowed to run, but their organisational capabilities are limited, and many are seen as aligned with or tolerant of military rule.

The junta has also redesigned the electoral system. The shift to a proportional representation model, implemented abruptly, alters the allocation of seats in a way that significantly favours the military-backed party. This system distributes seats based on party vote share rather than local constituency victories, reducing the influence of regional opposition groups and increasing the predictability of a pro-military outcome.

Vast areas of the country, particularly in the northwest and southeast, remain conflict zones where elections cannot be held. Resistance forces control large swathes of territory, and many townships lack functional administration. The election, therefore, will take place in only a portion of Myanmar, with the rest effectively excluded. A poll that does not include a significant percentage of the country’s population cannot be considered representative.

The backdrop to all this is the ongoing civil war. Since the coup, Myanmar has been engulfed in widespread conflict involving the military, ethnic armed groups that have fought the Tatmadaw for decades, and new resistance forces that emerged after 2021. This layered conflict has created one of Asia’s most severe humanitarian crises and profoundly shapes the context in which the election will occur.

What Internal Shifts Could The Election Trigger Within Myanmar?

Even though the election’s outcome appears certain, the process may still expose underlying strains. Analysts observe that the junta is under unprecedented pressure. Armed resistance has gained momentum in several regions, with ethnic armies capturing bases and challenging military control. The administration faces resource constraints, difficulty holding territory, and increasing international isolation.

A controlled election may deepen dissatisfaction among the public and armed groups. Previous moves by the military to consolidate power have triggered large-scale protests and uprisings, and some observers believe the election could lead to renewed unrest or symbolic acts of defiance in urban centres if security forces permit any public reaction.

Within the military establishment itself, officers may interpret the election differently. The vote could highlight internal divisions about strategy, governance, and the feasibility of long-term military control. Power shifts within the junta, even if subtle, could influence future negotiations with ethnic armies or external powers.

ly, the election may attract further scrutiny. Countries that have maintained cautious engagement with the junta may reassess their positions, particularly if violence escalates around polling day or if post-election crackdowns intensify. Any rise in pressure could alter the junta’s diplomatic calculations, including its reliance on major regional powers for support.

These internal and external shifts are important for India to track, as they may reshape the landscape along the India-Myanmar border and influence the strategic environment in the region.

How Border Instability Could Escalate For India

India’s long and porous border with Myanmar cuts through four Northeastern states: Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh. This frontier has historically been sensitive due to ethnic ties and insurgencies. Since the 2021 coup, these regions have experienced rising inflows of refugees and increased movement of armed groups.

A non-credible election that solidifies junta control is expected to prolong Myanmar’s civil war rather than ease tensions. Continued fighting in Chin State, Sagaing Region, and Kachin State — areas adjacent to Indian territory — could lead to periodic spikes in violence. Whenever conflict intensifies in Myanmar, civilian populations often flee across the border seeking safety. India has already seen such movements, especially into Mizoram, where communities share ethnic bonds with residents of western Myanmar. More than 83,000 people have fled to Myanmar, as per The Diplomat.

A prolonged conflict may also affect security dynamics in Manipur and Nagaland. Insurgent groups have historically used the forested areas along the border as corridors. Renewed military operations or new offensives by resistance forces could push militants closer to Indian territory, complicating border management for security agencies.

For India, maintaining stability along this frontier is a priority. Any escalation across Myanmar may require increased surveillance, humanitarian coordination with state governments, and more robust engagement with local communities.

Refugee Pressures And Humanitarian Fallout

Refugee inflows since 2021 have created complex challenges for the Indian government. Mizoram alone has hosted tens of thousands of displaced persons, offering shelter, aid, and community support. While the state government has taken a humanitarian approach, the logistical burden remains significant.

If post-election violence intensifies, additional waves of refugees may attempt to cross into Indian territory. Such movements place pressure on local governance systems, healthcare facilities, food supplies, and law enforcement. They may also create political tensions, particularly when state and central positions on refugee management diverge.

India’s policy has generally avoided formal refugee camps in the region, relying instead on community-based support. This approach may come under strain if numbers rise. The humanitarian fallout of continued conflict in Myanmar is therefore closely tied to India’s internal administrative capacities, inter-state coordination, and diplomatic engagement with Myanmar’s authorities.

Ethnic Insurgency Spillover & Cross-Border Challenges

The India-Myanmar border is home to a complex network of ethnic armed organisations that have fought the Myanmar military for decades. Groups operating in Chin, Kachin, and Naga-inhabited areas have historical connections across the frontier, and their activities often influence dynamics inside India’s northeast.

If fighting escalates after December, these groups may expand their operational zones or seek temporary refuge near border regions. Such movements can complicate India’s counter-insurgency operations or disrupt fragile peace arrangements in states like Nagaland and Manipur.

Arms trafficking is another concern. Myanmar’s conflict has fuelled the spread of small arms across its borders, and law enforcement agencies in India have periodically seized weapons tracing back to conflict zones. Intensified fighting could expand these trafficking routes, requiring increased vigilance from Indian security forces.

Additionally, the presence of multiple armed factions near the border risks unintended confrontations, misunderstandings, or spillover engagements that could affect local populations in India.

China’s Expanding Influence & Strategic Stakes For India

One of the most significant geopolitical consequences of Myanmar’s prolonged instability is the shifting balance of external influence. As the junta faces diplomatic pressure from other countries, it will increasingly rely on China for political support, military supplies, and economic engagement.

China’s investments in Myanmar (over $22 billion), including infrastructure projects, oil and gas pipelines, and port developments, give it considerable leverage. Its ability to engage both the junta and various ethnic armed groups gives it a unique position in shaping outcomes in Myanmar.

For India, this presents strategic challenges. New Delhi’s Act East Policy, which seeks deeper connectivity with Southeast Asia, depends heavily on access through Myanmar. As China’s role grows, India’s space to manoeuvre could shrink, especially if the junta becomes more dependent on Beijing after a non-credible election.

In maritime terms, there are reports that China is expanding its presence in the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar’s coastal projects also affects India’s security calculations. Continued instability reduces India’s ability to push its own projects and limits its influence in shaping regional outcomes.

Threat To India’s Connectivity & Development Projects?

India has invested $782.82 million in Myanmar as part of broader efforts to link its northeastern states with Southeast Asia. Two major projects highlight India’s long-term vision: the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway. Both have faced delays due to security concerns and logistical challenges.

The Kaladan project, designed to connect Kolkata to Mizoram via Myanmar’s Sittwe port and inland waterways, has experienced repeated disruptions as conflict expanded across Rakhine and Chin states. Security concerns have impeded work on certain stretches and complicated the movement of personnel and materials.

The trilateral highway faces similar hurdles. Despite progress in sections, renewed fighting along key routes makes construction and maintenance difficult. A stable political and security environment is essential for such projects to progress, and a military-controlled election reduces the likelihood of conditions improving soon.

The more conflict restricts mobility and administration in Myanmar, the greater the risk that India’s strategic investments remain stalled, affecting economic plans for the northeast and weakening regional connectivity efforts.

Possible Political Shifts After The Election

Although the December 28 vote appears predetermined, the period after the election may still witness political shifts. Some analysts observe that the junta, despite projecting control, faces increasing pressure and internal challenges.

The forced electoral process could lead to public displays of dissent if security forces allow any space for expression. In areas where the military’s control is weaker, resistance groups may intensify operations to delegitimise the vote. Such actions could further strain Myanmar’s administrative functioning.

Within the junta, efforts to consolidate political authority may create internal contestation. Leadership changes or reassignments may occur, potentially altering the military’s approach to negotiations or security operations.

External actors may respond differently depending on how the election unfolds. Increased sanctions, diplomatic criticism, or renewed engagement with ethnic organisations may follow, influencing the junta’s options.

The Road Ahead For India-Myanmar Relations

Myanmar’s December 28 election is unlikely to resolve the country’s deep political crisis or ease nationwide conflict. However, it marks a significant moment in a volatile trajectory that directly touches India’s borders, humanitarian obligations, security strategies, and regional ambitions.

The developments in Myanmar will continue to shape India’s engagement, requiring sustained attention to emerging dynamics and careful navigation of the complex realities on the ground.

News explainers Why India Can’t Ignore Myanmar’s ‘Sham Election’, What Could Be The Possible Outcomes?